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  Moral hazard and corporate governance are important factors in determining market 
transparency. The proposed study of this paper investigates the effects of these two factors on 
earning quality as well as forecasted earning in Tehran Stock Exchange. We have selected some 
stocks based on some predefined circumstances and extracted some necessary information over 
the period of 2005-2010. Based on these criteria, the information of 132 firms are qualified for 
the proposed study of this paper using 792 years/firm from 23 industries. There are two 
hypotheses associated with this study. According to the first hypothesis, we investigate whether 
there is a relationship between board of director independency and quality of forecasted 
earning. In the second hypothesis, we look to find out whether there is a relationship between 
the size of board of directors and quality of forecasted earning. We have used three models and 
using ordinary regression analysis tried to test the models. Based on the results of the survey, 
we have concluded that moral hazard does not influence forecasted earning, significantly. 
However, the results of this survey concluded that there is a meaningful relationship between 
forecasted earning and quality of earning. In terms of members of editorial board, quality of 
earning has a reverse relationship with absolute deviation of forecasted earning. In other words, 
as the number of editorial board increases, we may expect a more precise earning estimation. 
The other observation is that non-board member's duties have better motivation to contribute to 
firms and could make some changes.       
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1. Introduction 
Moral hazard and corporate governance are important factors in determining market transparency. 
During the past decade, there have been many studies associated with corporate governance. Xie et 
al. (2003) investigated the impact of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive 
committee as a barrier on earnings management. They demonstrated that the composition of a board   2796
in general and of an audit committee was associated with the likelihood that a firm would engage in 
earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds 
were also related to firms, which had smaller discretionary current accruals (Schleicher et al., 2010). 
Board and audit committee meeting frequency was associated with reduced levels of discretionary 
current accruals. Xie et al. (2003) reported that board and audit committee activity and their members' 
financial sophistication are important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to involve in 
earnings management. 
 
Lee (2009a) studied the effect of management earnings predictions in mitigating data asymmetry 
between investors and managers associated with moral hazard, and discussed how earnings guidance 
could facilitate monitoring. Lee showed that firms, which are more susceptible to moral hazard 
problems and less possible to monitor were also more likely to release annual earnings predictions, 
more frequently. Besides, Lee (2009) investigated how firm internal governance drives predicting 
decisions and showed that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives were related 
to higher likelihood and frequency of prediction issuance. Lee concluded that managerial equity 
incentives were associated with more informative and higher quality guidance. In other words, he 
explained that these forecasts were more accurate, unbiased, more specific and timely, consistent with 
equity incentives aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests regarding disclosure decisions (Lee, 
2010).  
 
Chau and Leung (2006) empirically studied the relationship between three major corporate 
governance attributes including family shareholding, non-executive directors and independent 
chairman and the existence of audit committees on a sample of 397 publicly traded firms in Hong 
Kong. They reported that at a medium level of family shareholding, the convergence-of-interest 
impact was dominant and the existence of audit committees decreased. At a high level of family 
shareholding, the entrenchment impact was also dominant and the existence of audit committees 
increased. Besides, they showed that the response of investors to audit committee existence was not 
associated with family shareholding when there was an independent chairman. They recommended 
that there was a positive relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on the corporate board and audit committee existence. They also reported that the positive 
relationship between independent non-executive directors was relatively stronger for corporate with 
an independent chairman. 
 
Dobler (2008) analyzed risk reporting incentives and their associated with regulation based on its 
inherent discretion, he explained that risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. 
 
Lee (2009b) investigated CEO performance-based remuneration in companies, which  experienced 
improvement in financial performance but maintained various board structures. The study analyzed 
how such payment associated with change in financial performance and board structures by 
comparing the cases between Australian and Singaporean firms. The results indicated that 
performance pay in both countries was linked to change in performance. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of CEO performance-based payment in both countries did not appear to be associated with board 
structure. Larger firms in both countries seemed to make big implementation of performance-based 
remuneration. Sales revenue was likely to be implemented by firms in both countries as a yardstick 
for determining CEO performance pay. 
 
Chi and Wang (2010) studied the relationship between information asymmetry and accounting 
conservatism by focusing  on a country – Taiwan – whose institutional background was different 
from that of the United States. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2011) performed an investigation 
on how analysts react to specific ownership structure characteristics by investigating the accuracy of 
their predictions after the release of the first Spanish corporate governance code and prior the IFRS 
adoption. They analyzed the impact of ownership concentration, bank ownership and insider F. Rouhi and S.A. Khalifehsultani / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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ownership on analyst prediction errors (Mintzberg, 1983). Overall, their results demonstrated a 
positive and substantial impact of bank ownership on analyst prediction accuracy, which 
recommended that bank ownership could lead to closer monitoring of management and a reduction in 
analyst prediction errors. Nevertheless, the presence of big shareholders and insiders in the ownership 
structure of the firm did  not substantially influence the accuracy of financial analysts. This research 
provided investors with a more refined sense of how analyst predictions could be influenced through 
the composition of the ownership structure in a context of high concentration of ownership, relevant 
presence of banks in firms as creditors, shareholders and local GAAP.  
 
Ballas et al. (2012) investigated the accounting policy choice based on unrealized gains or losses 
from securities and its pricing impacts by studying the market reaction to the mark to market 
accounting treatment of equity investments of Greek companies over the period of 2002–2004. They 
gathered the necessary data for firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and realized that, on 
average, enterprises chose to take valuation profits to the income statement and losses through equity. 
They also reported that the valuation adjustment incorporates necessary data for market prices while 
the market looks at the decision to charge the valuation adjustment to equity to be a negative signal.  
 
Schleicher et al. (2012) in a study investigated the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS in EU countries by demonstrating which types of economies had the largest reduction in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity post-IFRS. They also examined whether the reduction in investment-
cash flow sensitivity depends on firm size as well as economy type. They  recommended that IFRS 
adoption could have improved the functioning of capital markets in relation to small firms in insider 
economies. 
 
2. The proposed model 
 
Based on the discussion we have earlier in this paper, the following two main hypotheses are 
investigated, 
1.  There is a relationship between Moral Hazard and quality of forecasted earning.  
2.  There is a relationship between corporate governance and quality of forecasted earning. 
 
There are also two sub-hypotheses as follows, 
1.  There is a relationship between board of director independency and quality of forecasted earning. 
2.  There is a relationship between the size of board of directors and quality of forecasted earning. 
 
The proposed study of this paper gathers the necessary information from Tehran Stock Exchanges 
over the period of 2005-2010. According to our regulation, all stocks must be tradable for the period 
of studies. They must have a unique fiscal year ending March and must not have changes their 
business model within the period of studies. The other requirement is that no financial firm including 
banks, insurance or holding company is permitted. Finally, the structure of board of directors must be 
available for study. Finally, the stocks must be accepted at least in year 2003. Based on these criteria, 
the information of 132 firms have been qualified for the proposed study of this paper using 792 
years/firm from 23 industries.  
2.1 Variables 
2.1.1 Quality of forecasted earning ( 1 , _ + t i QUAL FC ) 
In this study, we compute this figure using three variables of profit, standard deviation of profit and 
difference (rang) between actual and predicted earning.   2798
2.1.2 Accuracy of forecasted earning ( _ FC ACC) 
This variable describes the accuracy of forecasted data calculated from the absolute deviation of 
actual price from forecasted in term of percentage.  
2.1.3 Bias of forecasted earning ( _ FC BIAS ) 
This factor is calculated as the difference between the actual earning from mean of forecasted earning 
divided by stock price at the beginning of the period.  
2.1.4 Spread ( _ FC SPREAD ) 
This variable is calculated from the difference between the lowest and highest stock price.  
2.1.5 Estimation of corporate governance ( _ Board Governance)  
•  In this survey, we measure corporate governance using two methods including board of 
director independency and size of board of director. 
1.  (BD_IND): Independency of board of director is calculated based on the number of Non-
board members duty 
2.  (BD_SIZE): The size of board of director calculated using natural logarithm of total number of 
editorial members.  
In order to calculated corporate governance we first calculate the median of two mentioned variables 
and for the data where corporate governance is one when the calculated numbers exceed the median 
and zero, otherwise.  
2.1.6 Moral Hazard ( , it Moral Hazard )  
The proposed study of this paper adopts Lee's (2010) method to calculate moral hazard based on the 
following variables, 
1.  PPE: This is the net value of assets and equipments.  
2.  IRISK: This ratio is calculated as standard deviation of residuals obtained using linear 
regression of CAPM using monthly information.  
3.  OM: operating profit margin calculated from operating profit divided by net revenue. 
4.  R & D: The is a research and development cost. 
5.  ADVERT: This is the direct cost of advertisement. 
6.   INVEST: Capital cost is calculated through operating cash flow.  
7.  BM: Book value on market value is calculated by dividing book value of equities by market 
value.  
8.  LEVERAGE: Leverage is calculated through dividing long term debt by total asset values. 
 
In order calculate moral hazard, we calculate the above nine indicators and when the value exceeds 
the median we consider one and zero, otherwise.  
2.1.7 Controlsi,t 
This control variable includes different components of concentration, fluctuation, return on equity 
and profitability condition as follows, F. Rouhi and S.A. Khalifehsultani / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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IOCONCENT: To calculate concentration ratio we use Herfindahl-Hirschman ratio. In this method, 
we calculate each shareholder's ownership and then the sum of squares of the calculated ratios are 
considered as an indicator for this ratio.  
EARNVOL: This item measures profitability fluctuations in three years period and it calculated based 
on calculating standard deviation of net profit divided by mean market value. 
ANNRET: Annual return of shares is calculated as follows,  
()
n t
n t t
t yP P
DPS yP P P y x
R
+
+ − − + +
=
−
−
1
1 1
 
where Pt  is stock price of firm i at the end of period t,  Pt-1  is stock price of firm i at the end of period t-
1, Pn  is nominal stock price of firm i, x is percent increase in capital from savings and y is percentage of 
receivables and cash capital increase. In addition, DPS is dividend per share and LOSS is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to one when firm is profitable in a year and zero, otherwise. 
2.2. Modeling formulation 
The proposed model of this paper considers the following model, 
,1 , , , , _( ) ( ) ( ) it i it i it i it it FC QUAL Board Governance Moral Hazard Controls αβ λ ϕ ε + =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑   (1)  
,1 , , , , _( ) ( ) ( ) it i it i it i it it FC ACC Board Governance Moral Hazard Controls α βλ ϕ ε + =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑   (2)  
,1 , , , , _( ) ( ) ( ) it i it i it i it it FC BIAS Board Governance Moral Hazard Controls α βλ ϕ ε + =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑   (3)  
,1 , , , , _( ) ( ) ( ) it i it i it i it it FC SPREAD Board Governance Moral Hazard Controls α βλ ϕ ε + =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑   (4)  
 
3.  The results 
We have performed regression analysis using ordinary least square technique to find the estimates for 
Eq. (1) to Eq. (4). Table 1 shows summary of statistics for the proposed study.  
Table 1 
Basic statistics of the proposed model 
     N  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max  Skewness  String 
FC_ACC  783    -0.0674 0.1047   -0.8673 0.0000 -3.799    21.614
FC_BIAS  783    -0.0051 0.1244 -0.8673 0.6236 -1.356  16.807
FC_SPREAD  783    0.0664 0.1082 0.0000 0.8731 3.302   16.542
PPE  784    0.4522 0.8029 0.0000 9.1804 6.584  58.967
PPE
2  784    0.8483 5.5453 0.0000 84.281 11.842   156.60  
IRISK  784    12.7341 9.9664 0.6030 84.073 2.810  14.404
OM  784    0.2035 0.1906 -0.7524 0.9604 0.736    7.075   
R & D  784    0.0001 0.0008 0.000    0.0095 8.437   83.050
ADVERT  784    0.0019 0.0060 0.0000 0.0805 6.318   58.937  
INVEST  784    0.0744 0.1832 0.0000 2.9984 9.891   138.29  
BM  784    0.7175 0.5280 -2.7143 3.5764 0.368   8.166   
LEVERAGE  784    0.0722 0.0859 0.0000 0.5739 2.550   10.824  
IOCONCENT  789    0.2835 0.2176 0.0001 0.8563 0.851    3.253   
ANNRET  789    0.0778 0.0819 0.0015 0.6720 2.910   15.272
EARNVOL  789    24.666 66.055 -87.030 477.59 2.677   14.741
Rt  789    0.0709 0.2569 0.0000 1.0000 3.341   12.165
 
According to the results of Table 1, we may find that there are between 783 to 789 data for each variable 
of the proposed model. The information of skewness and String also help us understand that that data 
can be estimated using ordinary least square techniques. Table 2 shows statistical observations for the 
regression analysis of three models.    2800
 
Table 2 
Statistical results of the proposed model 
Model Jarque-Bera  Breusch-P Durbin-Watson  Ramsey 
  Χ
2 P-Value  F  P-Value  D  F  P-Value 
First  5.756  0.0562  3.626  0.0000  1.81  0.480  0.4884 
Second  0.503 0.7773  4.098 0.0000  2.25  1.608  0.2052 
Third  2.527  0.2825  8.659  0.0000  2.25  0.056  0.8118 
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 2, according to Breusch-P represents F-value are 
meaningful and Durbin-Watson is within the acceptable limit, which means there is no auto correlation 
between the residuals. Table 3 shows details of the regression analysis for three models. 
 
Table 3 
The results of regression model for three models 
Coefficient    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Intercept   0.2308  -  
) 0.996  - (   
0.3077  
(1.626  
** 0.1528  
) 5.026 (   
CGI  
** 0.0479   
) 2.111 (  
0.0094   
) 282 / 1 (  
** 0.0119   
) 2.671 (   
BD_IND  
** 0.1320   
) 2.065 (   
0.0118   
) 0.692 (   
** 0.0306 -   
) 2.562  - (   
BD_SIZE   0.0588   
(0.435)  
-0.1942   
) -1.719 (   
** -0.0414   
(-1.376)  
Moral Hazard   0.0001  
) 0.019 (  
* -0.0061  
(-3.441)  
** -0.0021  
) -2.139 (   
PPE  
** 0.0509  
) 2.230 (   
0.0144  
) 1.282 (   
** -0.0256  
) -4.724 (  
PPE
2  
** -0.0080  
-2.977) (   
-0.0036  
) -1.537 (   
** 0.0041  
) 3.945 (   
IRISK   -0.0001  
) -0.186 (  
** 0.0005  
) 4.443 (  
** 0.003  
) 4.280 (   
OM  
** 0.1155  
) 2.079 (   
** -0.0792  
(-2.174)  
-0.0204  
) -0.753 (   
R&D  
** -14.899  
) (-2.485   
3.018  
) 1.067 (   
** 5.0792   
) 2.607 (   
ADVERT   0.4388  
) 0.3970 (   
** 1.010  
) 2.504 (   
8194 / 0  
) 448 / 1 (   
INVVEST   0.0130  
) 0.437 (   
0.0143  
) 0.743 (   
-0.0014  
(-0.171)   
BM  
** -0.0580  
) -4.298 (   
0.0022  
) 0.706 (   
** .0152 0  
) 6.264 (   
LEVERAGE    -0.1109  
) -1.247 (   
0.0185 - -  
) -0.391 (   
** 0.1102  
) 3.708 (   
IOCONCENT   -0.0028  
) 0.038 (   
** 0.0614  
) 1.938 (   
** 0.0303  
) 5.202 (   
EARNVOL   
** 0.1558  
) 1.997 (   
-0.146  
) -0.260 (   
-.0229  
) -0.998 (   
ANNRET    0.0001  
) 1.632 (   
-0.0001  
) -1.841 (   
** -0.0001  
) -4.460 (   
LOSS    -0.0466  
) -1.787 (   
** 0,0382  
) 5.947 (   
** 0647 / 0  
) 332 / 4 (   
  2.409 F=  
) 0.0000 (   
2.409 F=  
) 0.0000 (
  
3.967 F=  
) 0.0000 (
  
0.3771    0.4157    0.5396   
 
Based on the results of regression analysis, t-student value associated with Moral_Hazard is not 
statistically meaningful when the level of significance is five percent. Therefore, we cannot confirm the 
first hypothesis of this survey. However, In the second model, t-student value associated with F. Rouhi and S.A. Khalifehsultani / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Moral_Hazard is statistically meaningful and we can confirm the first model when the level of 
significance is five percent. The negative sign of this variable (-0.0061) means that there is a reverse 
relationship between Moral Hazard and deviation from profitability. In other word, when there is an 
increase of one unit in Moral Hazard, we may expect a reduction of 0.0061 unit in profitability. The 
third model also confirms the results of the second model and the coefficient of Moral_Hazard is 
statistically meaningful when the level of significance is five percent (P-Value=0.0329). As expected, 
the relationship is negative and it is equal to -0.0021 and similar result of the second model for the first 
hypothesis holds.  
 
From the results we have for the first model, we realize that t-student value associated with CGI is 
statistically meaningful (P-value=0.0352), when the level of significance is five percent. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is confirmed. The positive value (0.0479) means that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and precision of estimating profit. In other words, a one unit increase in 
corporate governance will lead to an increase of 0.0479 in precision of estimating profit. However, the 
second model does not confirm the results and t-student is not meaningful. Nevertheless, according to 
the third model, t-student associated with CGI is statistically meaningful. The positive coefficient means 
that there is a direct relationship between CGI and profit forecasting prediction deviation. In other 
words, when there is an increase of one unit in corporate governance, we can expect an increase of 
0.0119 unit in variability in profit estimation.   
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to understand whether there is meaningful 
relationship between moral hazard and precision of forecasted earning. We have also performed an 
investigation to understand the relationship between corporate governance and precision of forecasted 
earning. The proposed study has been implemented for some listed stocks in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
The proposed study has used three models and using ordinary least square methods, their coefficients 
were estimated. Based on the results of the survey, we have concluded that moral hazard has not 
influence forecasted earning, significantly. However, the results of this survey concluded that there is 
a meaningful relationship between forecasted earning and quality of earning. In terms of members of 
editorial board, quality of earning has a reverse relationship with absolute deviation of forecasted 
earning. In other words, as the number of editorial board increases, we may expect a more precise on 
earning estimation. The other observation is that non-board member's duties have better motivation to 
contribute to firms and could make some changes. 
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